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NICHOLAS CRAFTS*
The paper surveys the literature on the growth performance of the East Asian
economies, evaluates the sustainability of that performance, and provides a pre-
liminary assessment of their long-term growth prospects in the aftermath of the
current crisis. It highlights special features of East Asian growth, including unusu-
ally high factor accumulation and a favorable demographic transition, but argues
that total factor productivity growth has generally been somewhat disappointing.
It argues that there are downside risks to the East Asian “developmental state”
model, and that it may become less attractive as these economies mature. [JEL
N15, N25, N35, O11, O47]
T
he current Asian crisis calls for a reconsideration of the “East Asian mira-
cle.” Prima facie, it would seem to call into question some of the lessons that
it has been suggested that the West should learn from Asian capitalism. All of
a sudden, institutional arrangements in countries like Japan and Korea are being
seen as a handicap rather than a major asset to the growth process. Recent eval-
uations of East Asian growth (e.g., Collins and Bosworth, 1996, p. 139) have
tended to emphasize that the lessons for other countries are more to do with the
prodigious mobilization of investment and savings than the pursuit of rapid pro-
ductivity growth. Now, it would seem that capital accumulation is jeopardized
by failures in the financial systems of some countries.
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Against this background, this paper offers a survey that may help to inform
responses to the following questions—which are far too ambitious for a full
answer at this time.
• What was special about East Asian growth in recent decades?
• What does the financial crisis reveal about East Asian growth?
• Has the “developmental state” Asian model outlived its usefulness?
Obviously, there are enormous differences between the countries of the region,
to which this paper cannot do justice, and the paper certainly has more to say about
Korea than Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR).1 The argument that is
developed is a view from the outside using insights from applied growth economics
and European economic history rather than intimate knowledge of the region.
I. Overview of Catch-Up Growth in East Asia and Western Europe
The historical record strongly suggests that really rapid growth of real GDP per
person is confined to cases where countries that initially lag behind the leaders in
terms of income and productivity levels go through a phase of catching up.
Outside such periods, growth of per capita income does not typically exceed about
3 percent a year. The end of rapid catch-up growth therefore entails a deceleration
in economic growth. Krugman stressed well before the recent Asian crisis that this
would happen quite soon to the “tiger” economies as growth in East Asia would
run into diminishing returns (1994, pp. 77–8). Although this outlook is broadly
plausible, I shall argue that forecasting the dimensions and timing of such growth
slowdowns is rather difficult.
Two epochs in which remarkable catch-up growth was experienced were the
early post–World War II decades in Western Europe and Japan through the mid-
1970s and the last thirty years or so in several other countries in East Asia. The
“golden age” saw Western European real output per hour worked grow at 4.7 per-
cent a year between 1950 and 1973, much faster than before or since (Crafts and
Toniolo, 1996, p. 2), while East Asia enjoyed average growth of real GDP per per-
son at 4.6 a year from 1960 through the mid-1990s (Collins and Bosworth, 1996,
p. 136). Details of the growth rates and output levels achieved by individual coun-
tries are shown in Tables 1 and 2. This section examines some common features of
these episodes and points to some contrasts between the Asian and European cases. 
It is important to distinguish two aspects of the reduction in labor productivity
gaps that is characteristic of the catch-up process. One way in which shortfalls in out-
put per worker will diminish is through reductions and ultimate elimination of short-
falls in human and physical capital per worker. This is the familiar process envisaged
by traditional neoclassical models of growth, in which the transition to the steady
state is characterized by a temporary period of rapid growth during which diminish-
ing returns to investment gradually intensify. A second possibility is that the labor
productivity gap stems from an inferior level of total factor productivity (TFP),
reflecting some combination of lags in technological knowledge and/or the diffusion
of technology, inefficient allocation of resources, and inability to achieve economies
of scale. This is ruled out by assumption in the Solow or Augmented-Solow growth
1Before July 1, 1997, the territory was referred to as Hong Kong.models but has always loomed large in the growth accounting literature on why
growth rates differ (van Ark and Crafts, 1996). Historical experiences of catch-up typ-
ically involve both aspects but not necessarily in the same proportions.
There has been a great deal of econometric investigation of international cross-
sections of growth since 1960. A general finding is that growth rates are inversely
related to initial income levels providing that enough other right-hand side variables
are included. Barro (1997) offers a nice introduction by someone who has been a
central figure in this literature and whose successive specifications reflect the grow-
ing sophistication of this approach. This should not, however, be taken necessarily
to indicate support for some variant of the neoclassical growth model or for the
hypothesis that income levels will eventually either converge to the same level or
vary only according to the capital intensity of production in the steady state. As fur-
ther analysis of these large international data sets has proceeded, two important
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Table 1. Real GDP/Person in 1950, 1973, and 1996
($1990 International)
1950 1973 1996
Switzerland 8,939 Switzerland 17,953 Norway 22,256
United Kingdom 6,847 Sweden 13,494 Switzerland 20,252
Sweden 6,738 Denmark 13,416 Denmark 19,803
Denmark 6,683 West Germany 13,152 West Germany 19,622
Netherlands 5,850 France 12,940 Netherlands 18,504
Norway 5,403 Netherlands 12,763 France 18,207
Belgium 5,346 United Kingdom 11,992 Austria 17,951
France 5,221 Belgium 11,905 Belgium 17,756
West Germany 4,281 Austria 11,308 Sweden 17,566
Finland 4,131 Finland 10,768 United Kingdom 17,326
Austria 3,731 Italy 10,409 Italy 16,814
Italy 3,425 Norway 10,229 Finland 15,864
Ireland 3,325 Spain 8,739 Ireland 15,820
Spain 2,397 Greece 7,779 Spain 13,132
Portugal 2,132 Portugal 7,568 Portugal 12,015
Greece 1,951 Ireland 7,023 Greece 10,950
Singapore 2,038 Japan 11,017 Hong Kong 21,201
Hong Kong  1,962 Hong Kong 6,768 Singapore 20,983
Japan 1,873 Singapore 5,412 Japan 19,582
Malaysia 1,696 Taiwan Taiwan
Philippines 1,293 Province of China 3,669 Province of China 14,222
Taiwan Malaysia 3,167 Korea 12,874
Province of China 922 Korea 2,840 Malaysia 7,764
Korea 876 Philippines 1,956 Thailand 6,112
Indonesia 874 Thailand 1,750 Indonesia  3,464
Thailand 848 Indonesia 1,538 China 2,653
China 537 China 839 Philippines 2,369
United States 9,573 United States 16,607 United States 23,719
Sources: Maddison (1995), updated using Asian Development Bank (1997) and Maddison
(1997 and 1998).points have emerged: (1) that the neoclassical assumption of a universal technology
is quite probably false; and (2) that if, in general, there are obstacles to technologi-
cal diffusion, then should the costs of technology transfer fall there may be periods
of catch-up even where the underlying growth process is endogenous and long-run
growth rates show no tendency to equalize across countries (Sala-i-Martin, 1994).
The Augmented-Solow model based on a production function Y = AKaHbLg
with constant returns to scale has been seen as a good first approximation to inter-
national growth experience (Mankiw, Ramer, and Weil, 1992). There certainly
does seem to be strong support for the proposition that there are diminishing
returns to physical investment as this model would claim (Oulton and Young,
1996). Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the view of one of these authors
(Mankiw, 1995) that the neoclassical assumption of universal availability and
application of technological knowledge is also valid can be sustained. A closer
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Table 2. Growth Rates of Real GDP/Person
(Percent a year)
1950–73 1973–96
Initial Income Growth Initial Income Growth
Switzerland 8,939 3.1 Switzerland 17,953 0.5
United Kingdom 6,847 2.5 Sweden 13,494 1.2
Sweden 6,738 3.1 Denmark 13,416 1.7
Denmark 6,683 3.1 West Germany 13,152 1.8
Netherlands 5,850 3.4 France 12,940 1.5
Norway 5,403 3.2 Netherlands 12,763 1.6
Belgium 5,346 3.5 United Kingdom 11,992 1.6
France 5,221 4.0 Belgium 11,905 1.8
West Germany 4,281 5.0 Austria 11,308 2.0
Finland 4,131 4.3 Finland 10,768 1.7
Austria 3,731 4.9 Italy 10,409 2.1
Italy 3,425 5.0 Norway 10,229 3.4
Ireland 3,325 3.1 Spain 8,739 1.8
Spain 2,397 5.8 Greece 7,779 1.5
Portugal 2,132 5.7 Portugal 7,568 2.0
Greece 1,951 6.2 Ireland 7,023 3.6
Singapore 2,038 4.3 Japan 11,017 2.5
Hong Kong 1,962 5.5 Hong Kong 6,768 5.1
Japan 1,873 8.0 Singapore 5,412 6.1
Malaysia 1,696 2.8 Taiwan Province of China 3,669 6.1
Philippines 1,293 1.8 Malaysia 3,167 4.0
Taiwan Province of China 922 6.2 Korea 2,840 6.8
Korea 876 5.2 Philippines 1,956 0.8
Indonesia 874 2.5 Thailand 1,750 5.6
Thailand 848 3.2 Indonesia 1,538 3.6
China 537 2.1 China 839 5.4
United States 9,573 2.4 United States 16,607 1.6
Sources: See Table 1.look at the data even for the countries of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) suggests that a number of the implications
of the Augmented-Solow model are invalid.
First, tests based on time-series econometric methods have rejected both the
strong form of convergence that long-term forecasts of differences in output per
person for OECD countries tend to zero and also the weaker version that long-run
forecasts of output per person are proportional with a single long-term trend for
all advanced countries (Bernard and Durlauf, 1995; Mills and Crafts, 1999).
Second, Milbourne (1995) devised a test of the restrictions implied by the pure
Augmented-Solow model with no technological catching up and applied to the
OECD for the post-1960 period; he found that the restrictions were easily rejected
by the data and that about half of catch-up among the OECD countries could be
attributed to reductions in the TFP gap with the United States. Finally, Islam
(1995) reexamined the Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) results using panel data
methods and found that country-specific effects are substantial; his results imply
that TFP in the United States was 27.5 times the level of the lowest country in the
world in 1985, compared with 16.2 in Italy and 10.5 in New Zealand. 
Where catch-up growth has involved reductions in the TFP gap, it would be
wrong to attribute this simply to technology transfer, although technology transfer
certainly does play a part according to economic historians. For example, Nelson
and Wright (1992) document the conditions (market integration, spread of multi-
national companies, enhanced human capital formation in Europe) that made
accelerated technology transfer so prominent a feature of the European golden
age. At the same time, however, a substantial part of the European TFP growth in
that period seems to reflect improvements in the allocation of resources and
economies of scale in the halcyon era of Fordist mass production (Maddison,
1991). In the case of Italy, where TFP growth was very rapid, a careful econo-
metric study allowing for quasi-fixed factors of production, market power, and
economies of scale found that only one-sixth of TFP growth was attributable to
technological change (Rossi and Toniolo, 1992).
The upshot of this work is to suggest that countries vary both in the extent to
which they catch up and in the speed with which they reduce productivity gaps.
This reflects not only differences in rates of investment in physical and human
capital but also the effectiveness of their assimilation of technological opportuni-
ties. Growth projections based on the convergence properties of a neoclassical
growth model are unreliable. Indeed it is notable from Tables 1 and 2 that
European growth slowed down and that catch-up of the United States virtually
ceased in the 1970s—well before the gap in income per person had fully closed.
Indeed, given that steady-state income levels may be country specific, it is hard to
be confident about medium-term growth forecasts in fast-growing latecomer
economies—as the case of Japan in the 1970s underlines; witness the projections
based on growth accounting techniques in Denison and Chung (1976, p. 126).
The doyen of economic historians writing on this topic, Abramovitz (1986)
argued that these differences in the experience of catch-up growth would reflect
what he termed “social capability,” of which the standard of education is an
important component. In this view, human capital operates in the catch-up
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but rather as a determinant of the rate of change of TFP and ultimate level of
TFP through catch-up. Econometric support for this formulation is found in the
cross-sectional growth regression literature in the influential papers by
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and Islam (1995).
Social capability, however, clearly involves much more than education.
Abramovitz himself stressed the role of institutions and the incentive structures to
which they give rise. At one level, this involves rent-seeking, the political process,
and the ability of vested interests to thwart modernization of the economy rather
like the sclerotic tendencies highlighted by Olson (1982). More fundamentally, the
appropriation of profits is central to investment and efforts to reduce costs through
innovation. This suggests the importance of political and institutional structures,
which permit strong yet restrained and predictable government (Weingast, 1995).
In particular, government needs to be able to protect property rights and enforce
contracts but to refrain from expropriation, repudiation of its obligations, and
capricious behavior. Recent work in the cross-sectional growth regressions litera-
ture appears to offer strong support for this claim using measures of institutional
quality based on the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) (Barro, 1997;
Knack and Keefer, 1995).
It might be argued that central aspects of social capability concern the climate
for investment and the supply of finance. A key requirement is that transaction
costs are kept reasonably low and that entrepreneurs are not deterred from invest-
ing in fixed costs by opportunism and “hold-up” problems. At the same time, cap-
ital market institutions need to be able to allocate resources efficiently, to monitor
borrowers effectively and to reduce obstacles to financing investment arising from
asymmetric information (Levine, 1996).
In most respects, Western Europe generally had already established a political,
legal, and financial infrastructure capable of supporting rapid economic growth in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the postwar European context,
the remaining step taken to reduce “hold-up” problems involved the achievement
of unprecedented agreements between employers and organized labor that could
create a commitment technology for good behavior by both sides in the form of
wage moderation in exchange for high investment (Eichengreen, 1996). Countries
that were less successful in this endeavor, such as the United Kingdom, ended up
with structures of industrial relations that reduced their relative effectiveness in
pursuing rapid catch-up growth (Bean and Crafts, 1996).
For Europe, embarking on the period of fast growth depended on good policy,
in particular, avoiding or reversing the serious errors made in the interwar period,
much more than institutional innovation. For Japan, the situation was somewhat
different. The famous “Japanese economic system” of the postwar years—with its
distinctive employment practices, keiretsu, main bank system, all of which can be
interpreted as responses to the transactions costs problem—seems to have
emerged as a result of the wartime experience (Noguchi, 1998).
Catching up is not automatic, therefore, and absence of social capability may
be a crucial obstacle to growth and development in some countries. Gerschenkron
(1962) provided a famous discussion of the opportunities and difficulties of
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take-off into very rapid growth if they could substitute for “missing prerequisites,”
in particular a lack of “entrepreneurship.” This might be regarded as much the
same thing as establishing social capability. Gerschenkron’s arguments can be
restated as proposing that institutional innovations—to establish larger vertically
integrated enterprises, develop investment banking, provide strong cash-flows for
incumbent producers, and facilitate a major role for the state in investment deci-
sions—could solve coordination and hold-up problems for investors, mitigate
problems of asymmetric information in the supply of finance for industrialization,
mobilize savings, and develop infant industries. A clear implication of
Gerschenkron’s approach is that countries that develop rapidly from a position of
initial backwardness will have a legacy of institutions that are “unorthodox” from
a conventional Western standpoint. Japan is perhaps a case in point.
Obviously, there are several downsides to a Gerschenkronian development
strategy. First and most obvious is that the role of the state degenerates into crony
capitalism or plunder by myopic autocrats. Second, it may be that the institutional
structure delivers a lot of investment but is less good at providing incentives for the
efficient use of funds or innovation, as a view based on incomplete contracts or
agency theory might suggest. The Soviet version of the story seems to reflect an
extreme outcome of this kind, which resulted in severely diminishing returns in the
context of abnormally low substitutability of capital for labor (Easterly and Fischer,
1995). Third, at some later stage, it is likely that the allocative efficiency advantages
of freer capital markets will become much more attractive but the transition to such
institutional arrangements may be fraught with difficulties of preventing moral haz-
ard and eventual financial crisis where bankers and regulators lack the relevant
human capital and resources. Financial deregulation has, after all, proved hard to
manage in many advanced western economies (Mishkin, 1997). A fourth possibil-
ity is that the institutions that work so well at the outset eventually become dys-
functional but hard to change. Current discussions of Japanese economic prospects
increasingly tend to make this point concerning the future roles of the main bank
system, lifetime employment, and economic regulation (Ito, 1996).
These issues are important in the context of East Asia as strategies to achieve
rapid catch-up growth bear strong resemblance in many cases to Gerschenkron’s
recipe. While Hong Kong SAR may have followed a western-style development
strategy, the account by Rodrik (1995) of the approaches of Korea and Taiwan
Province of China to mobilizing investment matches the above description rather
closely. Moreover, the well-known “getting relative prices wrong” and “governed
markets” approaches of, respectively, Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990) to explain-
ing rapid growth in these countries can also be seen as having strong similarities.
These cases of “late industrialization” involve a stronger and more proactive role
for the state together with different approaches to coping with problems of oppor-
tunism and moral hazard from those typical in Western Europe during its catch-up
phase in the 1950s and 1960s.
Economic backwardness has another dimension, not central to Gerschenkron’s
account, but of considerable import in East Asia and in comparisons between that
region and Europe—namely, a demographic one. As economies develop from
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death rates both fall to much lower levels but during which there is an acceleration
of population growth because the falls in mortality tend to lead those in fertility.
This transition has an impact on the age structure of the population that tends ini-
tially to reduce and then to significantly increase the proportion of working age
people in the population. 
Western European countries had completed the demographic transition prior
to the postwar golden age of economic growth. They did not therefore experience
a demographic boost to labor inputs per person during this period. By contrast,
East Asian countries entered into demographic transition much more recently and
the proportion in the working age group rose rapidly in many cases between the
early 1970s and the early 1990s. A recent analysis has suggested that this change
in age structure may have offered a substantial but inherently temporary growth
bonus in East Asia, on the order of 1.5 to 1.9 percent a year, not only through its
impact on labor supplies but also through its effects on savings (Bloom and
Williamson, 1997). 
The golden age in Europe came to an end in the 1970s when TFP growth
slowed down markedly and permanently, diminishing returns to capital accumula-
tion became very apparent, and the postwar settlement between capital and labor
unraveled. Oil price shocks made the growth slowdown much more dramatic in the
short run but were essentially irrelevant to long-run growth outcomes. Absent the
recent financial crisis, something similar might have been expected for the leading
Asian exponents of catch-up growth, as Krugman (1994) and others have argued,
with the additional twist of the ebbing away of favorable demographic trends.
Nonetheless, the dimensions and timing of such a slowdown are not easy to pre-
dict, as this review has demonstrated. TFP growth will have a central role both
through its direct contribution to growth and its indirect impact on the speed with
which incremental capital to output ratios rise. But attainable TFP levels and the rate
at which TFP will approach its steady-state path depend on social capability, a con-
cept that is not quantifiable and changes in which are not predictable, even though
many of its ingredients are well understood. Given that Asian institutions, political
economy, savings habits, and demography differ from those of Western Europe, the
earlier experience of that region does not offer any precise guidance on the issue.
II. Productivity Performance in East Asia
The view expressed by Krugman (1994) that leading tiger economies are facing a
growth slowdown is based on an expectation that diminishing returns will soon
start to bite hard in economies where growth has come much more from factor
accumulation rather than improvements in TFP. This assessment relied heavily on
a growth accounting exercise in Young (1995), reported in Table 3, and seemed to
place heavy emphasis on the estimate for Singapore (Krugman, 1994. p. 71).
Given that the capital to labor ratio grew at over 3 percent a year in each of Korea,
Singapore, and Taiwan Province of China over 1960–94 (Collins and Bosworth,
1996, p. 157), if TFP growth was relatively modest, then the onset of diminishing
returns might indeed seem to be a potential problem in these economies. In fact,
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the results of some other growth accounting studies for comparison. 
Growth accounting typically relies on the following identity:
DY/Y = aDK/K + bDL/L + DA/A,
where a and b are the shares of wages and profits in national income, respectively.
It is an identity because DA/A is defined as the growth in output not accounted for
by increases in the factors of production, capital, and labor. This term is the resid-
ual after calculating all the other components of the equation and represents the
contribution of TFP growth. Measurement issues are fundamental to the use of this
technique and have been at the heart of the debate over Young’s estimates. 
The terms a and b are intended to capture the elasticity of output with respect
to growth of capital and labor, and approximating these elasticities by factor shares
is strictly valid only under perfect competition and where private and social returns
to capital are identical. In fact, in the OECD countries the use of profits share seems
to be a reasonable approximation (Oulton and Young, 1996). In the Asian context,
this may be more doubtful and this has prompted researchers subsequent to Young
to choose a and b on different grounds. Sarel (1997) bases his work on using inter-
national evidence to estimate technologically determined coefficients for each
major sector of activity and then derives weighted averages for each economy
according to their output composition. This leaves a in the range 0.28 to 0.35,
notably much lower than Young’s estimate of 0.49 for Singapore. Collins and
Bosworth (1996) discuss a wide range of evidence, on the basis of which they argue
for the imposition of a uniform value of 0.35 for a in each country for international
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Table 3. Alternative Estimates of East Asian TFP Growth
(Percent a year)
Young  Collins and
(1994 and Bosworth Sarel Adjusted
1995) (1996) (1997) Young
Period 1966–90 1960–94 1978–96 1966–90
China 4.6*
Hong Kong 2.3 2.4*
Indonesia 1.2* 0.8 1.2
Korea 1.7 1.5 1.3
Malaysia 1.1* 0.9 2.0
Philippines –0.4 –0.8
Singapore 0.2 1.5 2.2 1.0
Taiwan Province of China 2.6 2.0 1.9
Thailand 1.5* 1.8 2.0
Notes: Adjusted Young uses revised factor share weights with capital assumed to have a weight
of 0.35. Estimates marked with an asterisk refer to periods other than the column label, as follows:
in column (1): 1970–85; in column (2), 1984–94; and in column (4), 1966–91.comparisons. Assuming a common value for a permits the benchmarking of per-
formance and facilitates the use of growth accounting as a diagnostic in assessing
comparative growth performance. Table 3 reports the implication of adjusting
Young’s estimates using a = 0.35 in all cases.
Another difference between researchers concerns the treatment of improve-
ments in the quality of labor, in particular through education. Whereas Young
(1995) and Collins and Bosworth (1996) adjust their raw labor force estimates on
the basis of assumptions about rates of return to observed increases in schooling,
Sarel (1997) prefers to make no adjustment, with the implication that any unmea-
sured improvement in labor force quality will show up in the residual, TFP growth.
Moving to this procedure would typically add about 0.5 percent a year to Collins
and Bosworth’s TFP growth estimates.
A recent contribution by Hsieh (1997) provides a further check on Young’s orig-
inal results by calculating the dual measure of TFP growth, that is, that obtained by
comparing the growth of output prices with the growth of the weighted average of
capital and labor input prices. This method is also quite data demanding and the
results are preliminary; they indicate that TFP growth was significantly higher in
Singapore and Taiwan Province of China than estimated by Young (1995)—at 2.6
(for 1971–90) and 3.7 percent, respectively—but the method does not suggest any
great change for Hong Kong and Korea. Hsieh argues that official data almost cer-
tainly exaggerate the growth of the capital stock in Singapore, perhaps substantially
so, and that this is a strong reason to suppose that the contribution of capital to growth
was less and that that of TFP growth was more than found by other researchers.
These claims have been strongly disputed by Young (1998), who points to a
number of problems with Hsieh’s use of the data. His discussion provides another
angle on TFP growth by providing estimates of trends in factor returns in
Singapore that show growth in real wages at 3 percent a year and real rentals
declining at between 1 and 2 percent a year (Young, 1998, pp. 19–20). Using a =
0.35, this implies TFP growth in the range of 1.25–1.6 percent a year, similar to
the estimate by Collins and Bosworth (1996).
Apart from Singapore, the other country for which TFP growth estimates are
especially controversial is China. The problem here is the allowance to be made
for underestimation of inflation (and thus overestimation of real output growth) in
the official Chinese data. Recent estimates by Hu and Khan (1997) found TFP
growth for 1979–94 at 3.9 percent a year, while Maddison (1998), who examined
the price data in great detail, reported 2.2 percent for 1978–95. If Maddison’s esti-
mates are amended to give a weight of 0.35 to capital stock growth, TFP growth
would fall to 1.7 percent a year.
There is a more subtle reason for supposing that all these TFP growth estimates
are biased. They rely, as is conventional, on underlying assumptions about the nature
of the production function—namely, that the elasticity of substitution between fac-
tors of production is unitary and that technological change is Hicks-neutral. Rodrik
(1997) argues that the elasticity is likely in practice to be equal to less than 1 and that
technological change may well have been labor saving. In that case, the conventional
TFP estimate will be biased downward and is proportional to the growth of the cap-
ital to labor ratio, which has been rising steeply in the tiger economies. These points
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power in a comparative context since they probably also apply during the European
golden age, when capital deepening was much more pronounced (Maddison, 1996)
yet estimated TFP growth was much more rapid, as Table 4 reports.
Three main points emerge from this review. First, Young’s original estimates
are probably too low in some cases, especially with regard to Singapore, but the
later estimates, which are broadly similar, do not yield much stronger TFP growth
on average. Second, taking Collins and Bosworth’s estimates as representative of
recent work and convenient by virtue of their wide coverage, by comparison with
the fast catch-up countries of Europe and Japan during their golden age, prima
facie, the tigers do not perform strongly, as Table 4 reports. Third, China since the
late 1970s may be a case of rapid TFP growth but it seems likely that TFP growth
is seriously overestimated by official data.
Table 5 fills in the factor accumulation side of the sources of growth based on
conventional assumptions about factor shares, again mainly using Collins and
Bosworth (1996) as representative of recent research on Asia. The tendency for
Asian countries to have substantial growth from capital accumulation is clearly
shown and is underlined by the comparison with their European predecessors.
This originally resulted from relatively low incremental capital-to-output ratios
rather than much higher investment shares in GDP (Fukuda, 1999), although
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Sources: France, Japan, United Kingdom, and West Germany from Maddison (1996); Italy
from Rossi, Sorgato, and Toniolo (1992); Hong Kong from Young (1995) as amended in Table 3;
China from Maddison (1998) with amended capital share, see text. Remainder from Collins and
Bosworth (1996). Estimates for Europe and Japan refer to 1950–73, for China, to 1978–95, for
Hong Kong to 1966–91, and for others, to 1960–94.recently the latter have tended to be the main reason for sustaining the high con-
tribution to growth made by capital accumulation.
Table 5 also documents the much stronger contribution made by labor force
growth in Asian countries than in Europe, which is also quite important in aug-
menting the faster growth of total factor input in Asia than in Europe. This reflects
both the demographic distinctiveness of Asia in the context of its demographic
transition and, to a lesser extent, the tendency of hours worked a year to fall
sharply during Europe’s golden age (Crafts, 1997), an experience that has not yet
been repeated in East Asia. Tables 6 and 7 report these differences in labor supply.
Thus far, our review of the evidence has been broadly supportive of the posi-
tion taken by Krugman (1994)—with the exception of his severe indictment of
Singapore—in that it points to factor accumulation rather than TFP growth as the
aspect where East Asia’s growth performance is strong relative to historical prece-
dent. This raises a serious puzzle, however. Given the high levels of real GDP per
person in leading Asian economies such as Singapore and Hong Kong SAR, how
can they continue to beat the “3 percent is as good as it gets” rule for growth in
advanced economies, especially if their TFP growth is nothing extraordinary?
The resolution to this paradox may be found by consideration of productivity
levels, taking into account East Asia’s very different pattern of labor inputs per
person compared with Western countries. The most detailed comparisons of
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Table 5. Sources of Growth: Golden Age Europe and Japan 
Versus Recent East Asia 
(Percent a year)
Capital Labor TFP Output
1950–73
France 1.6 0.3 3.1 5.0
Italy 1.6 0.2 3.2 5.0
Japan 3.1 2.5 3.6 9.2
United Kingdom 1.6 0.2 1.2 3.0
West Germany 2.2 0.5 3.3 6.0
1960–94
China 3.1 2.7 1.7 7.5
Hong Kong 2.8 2.1 2.4 7.3
Indonesia 2.9 1.9 0.8 5.6
Korea 4.3 2.5 1.5 8.3
Malaysia 3.4 2.5 0.9 6.8
Philippines 2.1 2.1 –0.4 3.8
Singapore 4.4 2.2 1.5 8.1
Taiwan Province of China 4.1 2.4 2.0 8.5
Thailand 3.7 2.0 1.8 7.5
Sources: Europe and Japan from Maddison (1996) except Italy from Rossi, Sorgato, and
Toniolo (1992); East Asia derived from Collins and Bosworth (1996) except for Hong Kong, which
is based on Young (1995), and China, based on Maddison (1998) with factor shares adjusted to
match Collins and Bosworth’s assumptions. China estimates are for 1978–95.productivity levels are for manufacturing in six Asian economies by Timmer and
Szirmai (1997). They found that Korea and Taiwan Province of China have been
catching up with the United States such that by 1993 real output per worker in
Korea and Taiwan Province of China was 49 percent and 28 percent of the U.S.
level, respectively (Timmer and Szirmai, 1997, p. 15). By contrast, China’s labor
productivity was only 6 percent of the U.S. level—exactly the same as in 1980.
For both Korea and Taiwan Province of China it is clear that catch-up with the
United States has been in capital intensity rather than in TFP, which was still in
the late 1980s only about 30 percent of the U.S. level so that the remaining effi-
ciency gap is very wide. This is perhaps not so surprising given the growth
accounting estimates reviewed earlier, which highlighted factor accumulation as a
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Table 6. Demographic Underpinnings of Labor Force Growth
Growth Ages 15–64 Minus
Total Population Growth (%) Share of Population 15–64 (%)
1965–90 1990–2015 1965 1990 2015
China 0.9 0.1 52.8 67.2 69.3
Hong Kong 1.1 0.0 53.4 70.1 69.1
Indonesia 0.4 0.5 55.3 60.4 69.1
Korea 1.2 0.1 51.2 69.4 69.7
Malaysia 0.5 0.6 50.6 58.2 68.0
Philippines 0.4 0.6 52.1 57.2 65.8
Singapore 1.3 –0.1 52.0 70.8 69.1
Taiwan Province of China 1.0 0.1 52.5 66.7 69.3
Thailand 0.9 0.4 50.8 64.1 70.9
1950–73 1950 1973
Austria –0.4 61.8 56.2
Belgium –0.3 63.1 58.7
Denmark –0.1 59.9 58.7
Finland 0.2 59.8 62.5
France –0.3 61.1 57.8
Greece –0.2 61.4 58.7
Ireland –0.2 56.3 53.2
Italy –0.3 61.5 58.4
Netherlands 0.1 59.2 59.6
Norway –0.4 61.6 57.1
Portugal –0.2 60.1 57.8
Spain –0.3 62.0 58.0
Sweden –0.3 61.7 58.3
Switzerland –0.2 62.5 60.1
United Kingdom –0.3 61.2 57.0
West Germany –0.3 62.7 58.4
Japan 0.6 56.8 64.0
United States –0.1 61.0 59.9
Source: Derived from United Nations (1995).large part of these countries’ growth. Timmer and Szirmai’s comment appears
apposite: “[These data] point to abundant opportunities for further catch-up
growth in the Asian economies (except Japan)” (1997, p. 33).
Scope for further catch-up is certainly informed by remaining productivity
gaps, even though, as Section I made clear, this potential is usually not fully
realized. At the whole-economy level, comparisons of labor productivity levels
are perhaps a more reliable guide than those of TFP levels given measurement
difficulties. Table 8 reports these in terms of real GDP per hour worked. It is here
that the further implication of the contrasting trends in labor inputs per person
in East Asia and Europe becomes strikingly apparent. Once the differences in
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Table 7. Annual Hours Worked Per Worker and Per Person
Per Worker Per Person
1973 1996 1973 1996
Austria 1,778 1,710 741 725
Belgium 1,872 1,637 720 595
Denmark 1,742 1,644 842 797
Finland 1,915 1,790 900 732
France 1,904 1,666 783 600
Greece 2,000 1,733 724 641
Ireland 2,199 1,694 763 622
Italy 1,885 1,830 781 641
Netherlands 1,751 1,487 692 592
Norway 1,721 1,407 728 686
Portugal 1,900 2,009 768 853
Spain 2,238 1,810 818 559
Sweden 1,571 1,554 749 693
Switzerland 1,930 1,643 982 874
United Kingdom 1,929 1,732 861 764
West Germany 1,865 1,558 817 661
Hong Kong 2,400 2,259 1,008 1,127
Indonesia 2,010 2,200 754 903
Japan 2,201 1,898 1,065 976
Korea 2,428 2,453 798 1,099
Philippines 2,235 2,110 776 679
Singapore 2,410 2,318 872 1,193
Taiwan Province of China 2,690 2,339 930 988
Thailand 2,606 2,546 1,232 1,394
United States 1,896 1,951 782 931
Sources: Estimates for 1973 are taken from Crafts (1997). Estimates for Europe, Japan, and the
United States in 1996 are derived from OECD (1998) and Maddison (1997) where OECD figures
are not available. Estimates for Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan Province of China are
updated versions of those in Crafts (1997) and use the same sources. Estimates for other Asian
countries in 1996 were derived as follows: Indonesia: derived from Republic of Indonesia (1997).
Philippines: derived from Republic of the Philippines (1973 and 1993) assuming a 50-week work
year; data are for 1993, not 1996. Thailand: derived from Republic of Thailand (1973 and 1996)
assuming a 50-week year.age structure and hours worked per worker each year are taken into account, the
labor productivity gaps between Asia and the West are revealed to be much
larger than might be supposed from simply looking at real GDP per person. The
opportunity for further rapid catch-up growth has not been completely eroded
even in the leading East Asian economies.
It is also important to recognize that an economy’s TFP growth potential
through catch-up will tend to vary over time as its social capability changes rather
than simply depending on the productivity gap. In general, this will reflect insti-
tutional and policy changes and is not directly quantifiable. Nevertheless, social
capability for catch-up will be influenced in part by educational standards and
these are often (crudely) approximated by years of schooling of the labor force.
We might expect that as countries develop they are likely to experience not only a
narrowing of the productivity gap but also an improvement in educational inputs
to the catch-up process. To assess the net implications for catching up in TFP it is
necessary to weight schooling relative to the productivity gap. One such weight-
ing can be obtained from the cross-sectional econometric analysis of Benhabib
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Table 8. Real GDP/Hour Worked, 1973 and 1996
($1990 International)
1973 1996
Netherlands 18.43 Norway 32.46
Switzerland 18.28 Netherlands 31.26
Sweden 18.02 Belgium 29.84
Belgium 16.53 West Germany 29.68
France 16.53 France 28.47
West Germany 16.09 Italy 26.23
Denmark 15.94 Ireland 25.43
Austria 15.27 Sweden 25.35
Norway 14.05 Denmark 24.85
United Kingdom 13.93 Austria 24.76
Italy 13.32 Spain 23.50
Finland 11.96 Switzerland 23.17
Greece 10.77 United Kingdom 22.68
Spain 10.69 Finland 21.67
Portugal 9.86 Greece 17.08
Ireland 9.20 Portugal 14.09
Japan 10.35 Japan 20.06
Hong Kong 6.71 Hong Kong SAR 18.81
Singapore 6.22 Singapore 15.87
Taiwan Province of China 3.95 Taiwan Province of China 14.28
Korea 3.56 Korea 11.70
Philippines 2.52 Thailand 4.51
Indonesia 2.04 Indonesia 3.75
Thailand 1.42 Philippines 2.87
United States 21.24 United States 25.49
Source: Derived from Tables 1 and 7.and Spiegel (1994), which offers an interesting perspective on both on normalized
success in and opportunities for catch-up TFP growth.
In effect, Table 9 extends the comparison made earlier in Table 4. It reinforces
the suggestion that, in general, the European countries and Japan took more
advantage of their opportunities for catch-up TFP growth, this time normalizing
for schooling and productivity gaps. European countries tended to exceed the pro-
jected TFP growth, Japan matched it, and the other East Asian countries fell short,
sometimes appreciably so. The result is not universal, however, and Hong Kong
SAR stands out as an exception to this generalization.
Table 10 repeats the exercise of Table 9 for the East Asian countries from the
perspective of later years. For the leading tigers, it is clear that increases in
schooling have not outweighed the closing of the productivity gap, although rec-
ognizing the rather greater productivity gap with the United States in terms of
hours worked would modify the projections a little bit, as Table 10 shows. At the
same time, it is striking that actual TFP growth appears to have been much
stronger recently in several cases, for example, in Korea and Thailand, and to
have exceeded the projections in some countries, notably in Singapore and
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Table 9. Projected Versus Actual TFP Growth
(Percent a year)
Years of  Projected Actual
Schooling Gap TFP Growth TFP Growth
1950–73
France 8.18 1.84 1.3 3.1
Italy 4.92 2.81 1.4 3.2
Japan 8.12 5.13 3.6 3.6
United Kingdom 9.40 1.40 1.1 1.2
West Germany 8.51 2.25 1.7 3.3
1960–84
China 1.7 16.63 4.3 –1.4
Hong Kong 5.2 3.48 1.8 2.4
Indonesia 1.1 9.90 2.1 0.8
Korea 3.2 8.60 3.1 1.5
Malaysia 2.3 5.74 1.7 0.9
Philippines 3.8 7.52 3.0 –0.4
Singapore 3.0 5.62 2.0 1.5
Taiwan Province of China 3.2 8.00 2.9 2.0
Thailand 3.5 10.88 4.2 1.8
Sources: Years of schooling from Maddison (1996) and Collins and Bosworth (1996); actual
TFP growth from Maddison (1996) and Collins and Bosworth (1996), except Italy from Rossi,
Sorgato, and Toniolo (1992) and Hong Kong from Young (1995) for 1966–91, as revised in Table
3 and China for 1952–78 adjusted from Maddison (1998). The weighting formula to produce
column (3) is derived from Benhabib and Spiegel (1994, p. 162, equation 5) and is
0.0007 • Schooling • Gap + 0.0014 • Gap, where Gap is defined as the ratio of the highest GDP/-
person to that of the country concerned in the initial year.Taiwan Province of China. It would seem that other aspects of social capability
have been changing favorably so as to enhance the efficiency with which
resources are used and/or technology can be improved. Once again, this is a far
more optimistic basis on which to assess future growth prospects than might be
gained from a reading of Krugman (1994).
In sum, this review of productivity performance in East Asia leads to the
following conclusions:
• Neither levels nor growth rates of East Asian total factor productivity have
been as strong as the person in the street might suppose.
• Accordingly, productivity gaps with the West are still quite large and there
remains a good deal of scope for rapid catch-up growth before diminishing
returns to heavy capital accumulation bite severely.
• Exploiting this potential is not automatic but will depend on continuing to
improve social capability.
• The recent TFP growth of much of the region is considerably more impressive
than that of the early years of rapid economic growth.
Taken together, these points imply that growth potential is probably a good deal
stronger than Krugman’s pessimism would allow.
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Table 10. Benhabib and Spiegel TFP Growth Projections
(Percent a year)
Years of  Projected Actual
Schooling Gap TFP Growth TFP Growth
1984–94
China 3.6 14.04 5.5 1.7
Indonesia 3.8 9.86 4.0 0.9
Korea 7.9 3.47 2.4 2.1
Malaysia 5.4 4.32 2.2 1.4
Philippines 6.5 9.67 5.8 –0.9
Singapore 4.6 1.92 0.9 3.1
Taiwan Province of China 6.9 2.79 1.7 2.8
Thailand 5.1 7.20 3.6 3.3
Projected Actual
TFP Growth (1) TFP Growth (2)
1996
China 5.3 8.47 4.3
Indonesia 5.0 6.85 3.4 3.4
Korea 9.7 1.84 1.5 1.8
Malaysia 7.0 3.05 1.9
Philippines 7.4 10.01 6.6 5.8
Singapore 6.1 1.13 0.6 0.9
Taiwan Province of China 6.2 1.67 1.0 1.0
Thailand 7.5 3.88 2.6 2.6
Sources: As for Table 9, except that Projected TFP Growth (2) uses the ratio of U.S. GDP/hour
worked to that of the country concerned derived using Table 8.III. Downside Risks of the Developmental State
Section I recalled the argument in Gerschenkron (1962) that initially backward
countries have an opportunity for rapid catch-up if they take radical measures to
promote development through institutional innovations and controlled capital
markets. It was also remarked that this would tend to leave a legacy of institutions
different from the standard U.S. model and that, especially in the longer term,
there were a number of downside risks of this type of strategy. With the exception
of Hong Kong SAR, the fast-growing countries of East Asia all have some simi-
larities with the Gerschenkron model and it seems useful, especially in the context
of the present crisis, to ask to what extent the downside risks have materialized. 
This should not be done without first recognizing the strong positives, at least
for the more successful Asian economies. These include not only the mobilization
of very high rates of domestic saving and investment but also unusually strong
efforts to accumulate human capital and to improve and develop imported technol-
ogy. Imports of capital goods and foreign direct investment have clearly been cen-
tral components of technology transfer (Dahlman, 1994). A recent World Bank
report emphasized the success of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan in rapid develop-
ment of the information technology industry through effective public-private sector
partnership to overcome potential market failures in the diffusion of new technol-
ogy (Hanna, Boyson, and Gunaratne, 1996). The tigers’ prowess in technology
transfer suggests that the underperformance in TFP growth reflected especially in
Table 9 has its roots in other weaknesses in the developmental state model.
Recent empirical work has stressed the importance of institutional quality for
economic growth outcomes (Barro, 1997; Knack and Keefer, 1995). A clear risk
of a Gerschenkronian development strategy is that it is perverted into opportuni-
ties for rent-seeking and corruption that ultimately undermine economic growth.
This has clearly happened in some Asian countries and it has been suggested using
the same ICRG measure of institutional quality that this discriminates very well
between the winners and losers in Asian catch-up growth (Rodrik, 1997). Table 11
reports the ICRG scores of East Asian countries and also displays scores for a sim-
ilar measure, BERI, which has also been used in the regression studies and has the
advantage that it is first available for 1972 whereas ICRG did not appear until
1984 for most countries.
Table 11 does show some marked differences between Asian countries. When
the scores are first reported, Hong Kong SAR, Singapore, and Taiwan Province of
China look similar to the best European counterparts, whereas Indonesia and
Philippines look much less well placed. Korea is well behind the strongest coun-
tries in the table. Poor scores are unfortunate because econometric analysis shows
a strong link between corruption and foreign investment, which is just as evident
in East Asia as elsewhere in the world. Corruption has a similar impact to impos-
ing very high taxes on foreign direct investment (Wei, 1997). At the same time,
Table 11 also reports some quite strong improvements by 1995, at least on the
ICRG index, and a more encouraging picture overall in that year.
A second danger of the Gerschenkronian approach to development is that it
spawns government policies that serve the interests of special interest groups and
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example, through so-called “industrial policy.” Although there is no consensus in
the literature on the overall effects of these policies, even in the fast-growing
economies, econometric analysis is increasingly tending to find that selective
interventions on balance retarded rather than stimulated growth. An analysis of
industrial productivity growth across sectors in Korea during 1963–83 found that
tax and financial incentives did not enhance productivity growth, while nontariff
barriers to trade reduced both capital accumulation and TFP growth (Lee, 1995).
There is also evidence that Japanese industrial policies diverted resources away
from high-growth sectors toward declining industries and did not have a positive
effect on TFP growth within sectors during the period 1960–90 (Beason and
Weinstein, 1996). Similar results apply to Taiwan Province of China in the 1980s
(Smith, 1995). A drawback of the allocation of credit by government, whether
directly or indirectly, is that rates of return will not be equalized across sectors.
Indeed, the weakness of the Korean system of allocating credit is highlighted by
its failure to stimulate either profitability or productivity growth (Borensztein and
Lee, 1999).
A third class of problems arises from the desirability of reforming the initial
institutional arrangements that facilitate the initial phase of rapid growth when
solving coordination problems is perhaps the most dominant concern. In more
mature economies, the advantages of financial liberalization will create strong
pressures for reform even in relatively successful cases of “getting prices wrong,”
such as Korea. Yet, the eventual outcome of the financial liberalization process for
Korea has been a major financial crisis in 1997/98 that was made more likely by
its earlier approach to economic development.
The financial sector policies of a developmental state tended to place little
weight on auditing, capital adequacy, credit rating, disclosure requirements,
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Table 11. BERI and ICRG Index Scores
BERI 1972 BERI 1995 ICRG 1984 ICRG 1995
China 7.3
Hong Kong 49.0 46.7
Indonesia 6.6 7.0 15.0 35.7
Korea 9.2 9.0 28.7 45.0
Malaysia 9.4 8.8 41.2 37.0
Philippines 7.8 6.7 13.0 32.0
Singapore 12.2 13.2 47.5 45.0
Taiwan Province of China 11.0 11.5 44.0 43.3
Thailand 8.4 30.9 38.7
Sources: Data supplied by the collecting agencies. BERI is an index aggregating “bureaucratic
delays,” “nationalization potential,” “contract enforceability” and infrastructure quality” and has a
maximum score of 16. ICRG is an index aggregating “quality of the bureaucracy,” “corruption in
government,” “rule of law,” “expropriation risk” and “repudiation of contracts by government” with
a maximum score of 50.prudential regulation, or risk management (Park, 1994). Recent analysis of East
Asian financial systems suggests that these failings, and an associated greater
exposure to financial crisis in the face of macroeconomic shocks, were much more
characteristic of countries that followed the developmental state model, with the
notable exception of Singapore, than the relatively laissez-faire approach of Hong
Kong SAR (Caprio, 1998).
Asymmetric information, implicit guarantees for depositors, and weak bank
balance sheets—partly reflecting continued political pressures to support favored
enterprises: these are the makings of a classic recipe for moral hazard and a seri-
ous risk of financial crisis as liberalization proceeds unless regulators with incen-
tives and powers to take prompt corrective action are available. This is the more
true because the government itself is unlikely to be able to eliminate the moral
hazard problem by credibly promising not to provide implicit deposit insurance.
As capital markets are opened up to external flows, the overborrowing that is
symptomatic of this situation tends to be reflected in excessive capital inflows and
the eventual crisis will include a loss of confidence by foreign lenders and depos-
itors (McKinnon and Pill, 1996).
What then does the current crisis tell us about the preceding East Asian growth
process? It should not be taken to suggest that several decades of strong growth
should be seen as some sort of mirage. Rather, it reminds us that without adequate
regulation of the banking system, severe disruptions to economic growth are very
possible. Economic history offers many examples of financial crises in basically
sound and strong economies with high growth potential where the banking system
was fragile, for example, in nineteenth and early twentieth century United States,
and most notoriously in the U.S. Great Depression of the 1930s.
IV. Growth Prospects With and Without the Crisis
One way to provide an illustrative benchmark for future growth prospects is to
consider what a steady-state growth path for real GDP per person might look like
and then to compare the outcome with past performance. This approach has
recently been adopted for ASEAN countries by Sarel (1997) and for transition
economies by the EBRD (1997). The starting point for any such calculation is to
choose an estimate for TFP growth and growth of labor inputs per person. Capital
accumulation is assumed to come into line as in an Augmented-Solow or endoge-
nous innovation growth model. The results of an exercise of this type are shown
in Table 12.
Before considering Table 12 in detail, it is vital to recognize that the numbers
in it are not forecasts, although they may represent feasible paths that each coun-
try could sustain. The discussion of Section I gave many reasons why exercises
of this kind only produce benchmarks. In particular, it argued that forecasting
TFP growth during catch-up is extremely difficult because it depends on social
capability and policy choices and cannot be inferred from the predictions of a
pure neoclassical convergence model. Feasible TFP growth relies on scope for
catch-up and the projections in Table 12 therefore make use of the analysis of
Table 10; realizing this potential depends on good policy and is certainly not
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Philippines far exceed their recent performance and would surely require major
supply-side reforms to be realized, including improvement of their BERI and
ICRG scores (see Table 11) to the Singaporean level. This would not only curtail
rent-seeking but also facilitate the role of the financial system in promoting
growth (Levine, 1998).
Against a background of rather disappointing TFP performance, attention to
supply-side reform that will lead further from the developmental state model is
required generally in East Asia if opportunities for further rapid catch-up are to be
fully realized through the efficient management of firms and enhancement of
domestic innovation. Thus, developing a legal infrastructure that fosters investor
protection and the availability of equity finance appears to be important for
research-and-development-intensive activities (Carlin and Mayer, 1998). In the
absence of effective control by shareholders, competition is the best discipline on
managers’ failure vigorously to pursue productivity growth (Nickell, 1996). This
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Table 12. Illustrative Steady-State Growth Projections 
(Percent a year)
Labor/ GDP/ 2015 S/Y I/Y
TFP Person K/Y I/Yreqd  pop income 1991–96 1991–96
China 3.6 0.8 1.7 21.1 6.3 8,998 40.1 39.2
Indonesia 3.4 1.2 2.8 35.8 6.4 11,253 32.1 34.7
Korea 2.2 0.6 2.9 28.1 4.0 27,120 35.4 36.9
Malaysia 1.9 1.1 2.5 27.0 4.0 16,354 35.0 41.5
Philippines 3.6 1.1 2.0 26.6 6.6 7,970 19.0 22.2
Singapore 1.3 0.6 2.9 24.7 2.6 34,165 47.8 34.6
Taiwan Province of China 1.4 0.6 1.8 15.5 2.8 24,031 27.4 23.4
Thailand 2.6 1.4 2.2 23.8 4.9 15,210 34.9 42.6
Sources: TFP: projected TFP growth based on catch-up component using Benhabib and
Spiegel (1994, p. 162, equation 5) except for China and Philippines, where it is assumed that catch-
up would not exceed Japanese TFP growth in 1950–73, and Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan Province
of China, where the development of a research and development capability is assumed to add a fur-
ther 0.4 percent a year to TFP growth. Labor/person: projected growth of labor inputs per person
derived from United Nations (1995) and an addition of 0.5 percent a year (0.7 percent in China,
Indonesia, and Singapore) for improved labor force quality from extra schooling based on past
trends as estimated by Collins and Bosworth (1996). K/Y: the 1994 capital to output ratio (Collins
and Bosworth, 1996, p. 189). I/Yreqd: the percentage of GDP needed to be invested to maintain the
capital to labor ratio along the steady-state path, assuming 5 percent of the capital stock depreci-
ates each year and a = 0.35. The steady-state growth path is characterized by a constant capital to
output ratio in which case 
DY/Y = DL/L +  DA/A ———.
(1 – a)
GDP/Pop: derived steady-state growth rate for real GDP per head. 2015 income: projected real
GDP per person measured in 1990 $ international (comparable with the estimates in Table 1)
assuming the steady state is maintained. S/Y: the domestic savings ratio (Asian Development Bank,
1997). I/Y: the domestic investment ratio (Asian Development Bank, 1997).suggests that the Gerschenkronian neglect of competition policy in East Asia so
far is an important error that needs to be rectified.
Comparisons with post–golden age Japan and Western Europe, where most
countries have fallen well short of the TFP growth projected for the leading tigers
in Table 12 may be instructive in considering whether the tigers will achieve these
TFP benchmarks. Thus, slowdown in TFP growth has undermined the 1970s pro-
jections for Japan made on a growth accounting basis by Denison and Chung
(1976). While they recognized that earlier Japanese growth had a very high tran-
sitory catch-up component, they thought that this would not be completely
exhausted until about 2002. They projected an average growth rate of 6.2 percent
for real GDP from 1971–2000 (Denison and Chung, 1976, p. 126), with growth in
the first half of the 1990s still up around 5.5 percent a year.
Why were Denison and Chung wrong? The main reason is that they assumed
much stronger growth in TFP from continued catch-up. In fact, Japan has become
a somewhat sclerotic economy, in significant part due to excessive regulation, and
has weak productivity performance in the nontradables sector. Whereas labor pro-
ductivity in tradables grew at 4.6 percent a year between 1981 and 1992, in non-
tradables growth was only 1.9 percent and in services only 0.5 percent a year (Ito,
1996, p. 237). Even in manufacturing, Japan did not close the labor productivity
gap with the United States at all between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s (Pilat,
1996). Significant reforms to the postwar Japanese economic system may well be
required before Japan can resume its catch-up of the United States.
The slowdown in European productivity growth after the golden age probably
also reflects a reluctance to deregulate even though the postwar settlement no
longer delivers fast growth. A quantitative study by Koedijk and Kremers (1996)
found that, if West Germany had deregulated its product markets to the same
extent as Ireland, its TFP growth in the business sector could have been over 1 per-
cent a year higher. In the European case, a further influence on overall productiv-
ity growth has been the rapid growth of the public sector and taxation as a
proportion of GDP. While current government spending in the median West
European country was 31.9 percent of GDP in 1960–73, in the first half of the
1990s this had risen to 50.6 percent (OECD, 1995; OECD, 1997). The impact that
rising tax burdens have on growth rates is a very controversial topic in applied eco-
nomics but the trend in recent studies has been to find that an increase of this mag-
nitude in the tax burden could have an appreciable, negative impact on growth of
at least 1 and perhaps 2 percent a year (de la Fuente, 1997; Engen and Skinner,
1996; Leibfritz, Thornton, and Bibbee, 1997). Thus, the slowdown in European
growth appears to have been exacerbated by policies targeting other objectives.
There are two contrasting implications of this discussion for East Asian
growth prospects. First, some aspects of the Asian situation appear more favorable
than in the European case, notably, the absence of the pressures of aging on fiscal
policy and the lack of a tradition of expensive social programs, which may reduce
the risk of rising taxation inhibiting growth. Second, catch-up is not automatic and
would tend to be held back by inappropriate policy or inefficient use of capital.
The industrial policy prescriptions of the developmental state, which are liable to
result in the support of declining industries at the expense of the rapid exploitation
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phase of catch-up. Well-handled financial liberalization can help strengthen mar-
ket disciplines, which will facilitate better productivity performance.
For most of the economies in Table 12, the steady-state growth projection is
below the rates achieved in the recent past. There are three reasons for this:
• scope for further catch-up is now reduced, although not exhausted;
• labor force growth will slow appreciably; and 
• most countries have been enjoying transitional growth with capital deepening
at above the steady-state rate.
The steady-state projections are, however, notable for the relatively modest
demands they would place on domestic savings relative to recent levels and could
be achieved with lower domestic investment rates than have prevailed in the past.
Given that demographic factors will not tend to reduce domestic savings much
even in the countries where the demographic transition is most advanced before
2010 (Heller and Symansky, 1997), savings would not seem to be a constraint on
achieving these growth rates. One way for growth to be higher than these projec-
tions would be for countries to continue to invest more. For example, if Korea and
Singapore, while sustaining the TFP growth of Table 12, invested sufficiently to
reach the Japanese capital to output ratio of 4.6 by 2015, growth of real GDP per
person would be projected over the 20-year period to average 5.1 and 3.7 percent,
respectively.
This review of Asian growth prospects essentially represents the situation
before the present crisis. Indeed, the TFP growth rates chosen to illustrate the
steady-state paths are broadly within the range thought likely in a recent precrisis
OECD projection that projected TFP growth for “dynamic Asia” at 2.0 to 2.8 per-
cent and for China at 2.0 to 3.4 percent a year through 2020 (Richardson, 1997).
It is surely too soon to be sure how much has changed or even how many coun-
tries will eventually become directly rather than indirectly affected by financial
and/or currency crises.
Some favorable features of strong growth countries will presumably be
resilient—these might include stocks of human capital, high personal savings, and
effective mechanisms for technology transfer and their outward orientation.
Others, such as high investment rates, are likely to be undermined in the short
term, although not necessarily in the longer term, as U.S. experience during the
Great Depression suggests. In that case, the economy returned to its earlier trend
growth path by the early 1940s (Ben-David and Papell, 1995). The 1930s U.S.
example argues that even a massive financial crisis need not damage long-term
growth potential provided that the banking system is rehabilitated and reregulated
(Crafts, 1999).
The most intriguing aspect of the crisis is whether it will tend to promote
favorable institutional and policy innovations, leading to improved productivity
performance and better use of capital. There is no model available that we can turn
to for predictions, though it is sometimes claimed that crisis may be necessary to
overcome the status quo bias of politics as usual and thus to facilitate reform pack-
ages. Rodrik (1996, pp. 28–9) has argued that in deep crisis it is possible to deliver
widespread income gains by policies to revive economic activity and that this may
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161allow reformist policymakers to add on microeconomic and structural reforms that
would be difficult to implement in normal times because of their distributional
implications. Given that microeconomic reform to the Asian developmental state
model is clearly required, it is possible that the crisis could actually be helpful to
long-term growth despite its devastating short-term impact.
V. Conclusions
It is now time to reflect on the questions posed in the introduction in the light of
the discussion of the intervening sections of the paper. The comments to be made
are in the nature of generalizations that really deserve to be heavily nuanced and
qualified but may nevertheless serve a useful purpose by provoking others to react.
Three special aspects of East Asian growth have been highlighted. First, com-
pared with the European golden age, it is the factor accumulation of the region
rather than its TFP growth that has been most impressive. High investment has
been a striking achievement of the policies adopted by countries in the region with
regard to both physical and human capital. Having said this, productivity perfor-
mance has been stronger than expected by the most strident critics. Second, the
population profile of East Asian growth marks it out as different, especially in the
tigers that have experienced a temporary demographic gift of rising labor force
participation in recent decades. Third, in many countries development has
occurred rapidly from an initial position of “economic backwardness” and this has
generated its own legacy of financial and other institutions. This history does exert
an influence, both positive and negative, on future growth prospects.
The current Asian crisis seems to owe a great deal to the weakness of finan-
cial systems, reflected in overborrowing and excessive investment together with
inadequate regulatory responses. This probably says more about the way that
financial liberalization has been handled than about the fundamental growth
potential of the economies concerned. Nevertheless, the Korean experience, in
particular, does suggest that its earlier approach to financial market decision mak-
ing and regulation left the economy badly exposed to a high risk that financial lib-
eralization would turn out badly and thus jeopardized long-run growth.
This tends to suggest that there are downsides to the “developmental state”
model that its proponents tend to gloss over—in particular its tendency to waste-
ful investment and the difficulties that it may pose for an eventual transition to a
freer capital markets model. The latter will tend to grow in attractiveness after the
initial phase of development when coordination problems loom much less large
and diminishing returns become a bigger threat, such that efficient use rather than
sheer volume of investment becomes a higher priority. The greatest successes of
the managed development approach have tended to come in the context of export-
orientated manufacturing and industrialization. In the coming years of deindustri-
alization, a different model may be more appealing. 
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